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Seema Narayan and Paresh Kumar Narayan 
 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of US macroeconomic conditions—namely, 
exchange rate and short-term interest rate—on the stocks of seven Asian countries (China, 
India, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and South Korea). Using daily data for 
the period 2000 to 2010, we divide the sample into pre-crisis period (pre-August 2007) and 
crisis period (post-August 2007) we find that in the short-run interest rate has a statistically 
insignificant effect on returns for all countries except the Philippines in the crisis period, 
while except for China, regardless of the crisis, depreciation had a statistically significant 
negative effect on returns. When the long-run relationship among the variables is considered, 
for four of the seven countries (India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) while 
there  was  cointegration  in  the  pre-crisis  period,  in  the  crisis  period  there  was  no  such 
relationship, implying that the financial crisis has actually weakened the link between stock 
prices and economic fundamentals.  




The link between macroeconomic variables and returns on investments was first established 
by Ross (1976) as inherent in  his proposed arbitrage pricing theory, which basically argued 
that a range of variables are possible determinants of returns without really identifying these 
variables.  This  research  gap  was  addressed,  however,  by  Roll  and  Ross  (1980),  who 
identified four main factors—namely unanticipated changes in the inflation, risk premiums, 
the term structure of interest rates, and industrial production—as determinants of returns. 
Subsequently, a large number of studies have empirically examined the relationship between 
key macroeconomic variables and stock returns; among influential studies, see Chen et al. 
(1986) and Fama (1981). 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of the US macroeconomic conditions, proxied 
by  exchange  rate  (US  vis-à-vis  local  currency)  and  short-term  US  interest  rate  on  stock 
returns of seven Asian countries, namely India, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore,  and  South  Korea.  The  proposed  work  is  different  from  the  literature  in  two 
distinct ways. First, we examine whether the impact of these two US macro variables had 
different  effects  on  returns  in  these  Asian  countries  in  the  pre-2007  financial  crisis  as 
compared  with  the  crisis  period  (post-2007  period).  One  feature  of  the  traditional  and 
voluminous literature alluded to earlier is that they consider only domestic macroeconomic 
conditions on stock market returns. There are very few studies that consider the impact of 
foreign macroeconomic factors. The exceptions are Christie-David et al. (2002) and Becker 
et al. (1995) who examined the reaction of the US and foreign bond futures prices from US 
macroeconomic news announcements; Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004), who examined both 
domestic and worldwide (proxied by the US) macroeconomic news in stock valuations on 3 
 
European stock markets; and Nasseh and Strauss (2000), who used a variance decomposition 
analysis  and  unravelled  that  German  short-term  interest  rates  affected  stock  prices  in 
European countries. Considering the US market in this regard is crucial, for as explained by 
Dumas and Solnik (1995) given the high degree of integration between emerging economies 
and the USA. In addition, a sound argument in favour of modelling the influence of the US 
macroeconomic condition is provided by Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004: p. 201-202), who 
contend  that  firms  operating  in  several  markets  are  not  only  concerned  about  what  is 
happening in one particular market, rather they are interested in the economic conditions in 
the largest market, for this has implications on their profitability and decision making. 
 
Second, because of the short sample period due to the fact the financial crisis is only a few 
years old means that unlike the extant literature we cannot use monthly data; rather, to have a 
reasonable  sample  period  for  estimation,  we  need  to  use  daily  data,  which  we  do.  Our 
approach of using daily data for econometric reasons, as well as to provide as an opportunity 
to for the first time examine the impact of US macro variables in the pre-crisis and crisis 
period, actually precludes us from using a wide range of macro variables as proposed by, for 
instance,  Roll  and  Ross  (1980).  This  caveat  is  a  result  of  the  fact  that  daily  data  on 
unemployment, industrial production, and inflation does not exist.   
 
We organise the balance of the paper as follows. In section 2, we discuss the empirical model 
and the theoretical framework that motivates the empirical model. In section 3, we discuss the 




2. Empirical Model and Theory 
In this section, we discuss our proposed model and the theoretical framework that motivates 
the empirical analysis. As mention earlier, our concern in this paper is on the potential role of 
the US macro variables—namely the exchange rate (US vis-à-vis China, India, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and South Korea) and US short-term interest rate – on 
returns from seven Asian markets. Based on this, the functional form of the relationship 
between returns and US macro variables takes the following form: 
                                              𝑅 = ? 𝐸𝑅,𝐼𝑅                                                         1  
This amounts to the following regression model: 
                                       𝑅𝑡 = ?0 + ?1𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡+?2𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡                           2  
Where 𝑅 is the returns calculated as 𝑙𝑜? 𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡−1     of each of the seven Asian countries; 𝑅𝐸𝑅 
is the return on the bilateral exchange rate – domestic currency per US dollar, calculated as 
𝑙𝑜? 𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝐸𝑅𝑡−1    , such that an increase in the exchange rate represents an appreciation of the 
domestic currency; and 𝑅𝐼𝑅 is the return on the short-term US interest rate proxied by the 
Federal Funds Target Rate (FDTR) index, calculated as 𝑙𝑜? 𝐼𝑅𝑡 𝐼𝑅𝑡−1    . Data is daily and 
for  the  period  5  January  2000  –  25  January  2010.  All  the  data  are  downloaded  from 
BLOOMBERG.  Equation  (2)  is  estimated  for  each  of  the  seven  countries  based  on  the 
ordinary least squares estimator. As a robustness check, we also estimate Equation (2) using a 
GARCH (1,1) model, which has the following form:  
                                                      𝑅𝑡 = ?0 + ?1𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡+?2𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡      3  
                                                 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + ?1𝜇𝑡−1
2 + ?2𝜎𝑡−1
2 + 𝜀𝑡     4    
   5 
 
Equation  (3)  represents  the  mean  equation  for  stock  market  returns,  while  equation  (2) 
represents  the  variance  of  stock  returns  as  a  function  of  news  about  volatility  from  the 
previous period, represented by ?1 the ARCH terms, and the last period’s forecast variance 
represented by ?2, the GARCH term. 
 
In addition, we also conduct tests for cointegration among the levels of the variables for each 
of the seven countries and where a cointegration relationship is found, we augmented the 
mean equation of the GARCH (1,1) model (equation 3) with the one-period lagged error 
correction term, and call this the ECM-GARCH (1,1) model. 
Based on equation (2), we propose two testable hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis  1:  that  depreciation  reduces  returns.  This  relationship  is  explained  by 
Markowitz’s (1952, 1991) portfolio theory, whereby a depreciation of the domestic currency 
leads to a portfolio switch, from domestic assets to foreign assets. This results due to the fact 
that depreciation reduces returns for foreign investors  
 
Hypothesis 2a: that an increase in the US short-term interest rate will have a negative effect 
on returns. The reason is as follows. When the US interest rate rises, foreign investors (and 
also well diversified domestic investors) can potentially withdraw their investment from the 
domestic market and invest in the US money market, provided that the new interest rate is 
higher than returns from the stock market.  6 
 
Hypothesis 2b: that an increase in the US short-term interest rate will have a positive effect 
on returns. This relationship is possible if, as Nasseh and Strauss (2000) argue, short-term 
interest rates are positively related to stock prices. Because stock prices are positively linked 
to macroeconomic activity, including economic growth, which in turn has a positive effect on 
stock market performances (see, inter alia, King and Levine, 1993; Liu and Hsu, 2006 ), an 
increase in stock prices resulting from a rise in foreign interest rate will lead to a positive 
effect on returns.  
 
3.   Empirical Analysis 
3.1.  Integrational properties of data 
Before conducting the regression analyses, we tested the time series properties of the series 
by applying the conventional augmented Dickey Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, Said and 
Dickey, 1984) test. This tests the unit root null hypothesis against the alternative of mean 
stationary. The null is rejected if the AFD statistic is less than the critical value.   
The ADF test results are presented in Table 1. We were unable to reject the unit root null for 
the series of all seven countries for all thee different sample periods. As a result, these series 
appear in the GARCH framework and the short-run OLS regression model in first differenced 
form.   
3.2.   Main findings 
3.2.1.   Short-run results 
The OLS and the GARCH results are presented in Table 2. Clearly, both the OLS estimations 
and GARCH framework have produced consistent results across the three samples.  As a 7 
 
result  we  concentrate  on  the  GARCH  estimated  short-term  results.  The  exchange  rate 
variable is found to be the only significant variable at the 5 per cent level or better for all 
except Philippines. Stock returns in Philippines are also found to be significantly affected by 
news on US interest rates in the full sample period and the period covering the crisis and 
beyond.  
 
The exchange rate, which is expressed as local currency per US dollar, is found to have a 
negative effect on stock returns of all seven countries. This suggests that a depreciation of 
any of the seven Asian countries’ currency against the US dollar leads to a fall in equity 
returns.  India,  Singapore,  South  Korea,  Thailand,  and  Philippines,  show  a  significant 
relationship  between  exchange  rate  and  equity  returns  in  all  three  samples  examined.  A 
comparison of these three periods show that stock returns have become much more sensitive 
to exchange rate movement against the US since the onset of the crisis. The OLS estimations 
suggest that China’s equity market were not significantly affected by the China-US exchange 
rate but became significant since the Global Financial crisis. In contrast, Malaysian stock 
returns were more sensitive to exchange rate movements prior to the Global crisis than during 
the crisis.  
 
The Asian equity markets do not seem to be sensitive to news on changes in the monetary 
policy stance in the US. Only Philippine’s stock market shows a significant link between the 
US  Interest  rates.  This  relationship  is  positive,  which  means  that  an  increase  in  the  US 
interest rates leads to an increase in equity returns in Philippines. 
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For completeness, we also provide results from the ECM-GARCH model for these countries. 
These models were estimated for country samples that showed a cointegrating relationship 
for the equation of interest here. The cointegration test was performed using the Johansen 
(1991, 1995) test. The results on the Trace test and Maximum Eigenvalue test are presented 
in Table 3. A summary of these results are displayed in Table 4. For the full sample, we find 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship between stock returns, the exchange rate (in the US 
dollars) and the US interest rate for all countries, except India. A long run relationship is 
apparent in the pre-crisis period for all Asian countries studied. However, there is limited 
evidence of a long run relationship since the crisis period. Only China and Korea show a 
cointegrating relationship between stock prices, movements in their currency relative to that 
of the US and the US interest rates. 
 
On the basis of the Johansen test result, we estimated the ECM-GARCH models. The ECM-
GARCH results are presented in Table 5. We find that the results emerging from this class of 
models are broadly consistent when compared with the GARCH models. 
 
3.2.2 Long-run results 
 
On the basis of the cointegration results, we also estimated the long-run results. These results 
are presented in Table 6. In the long-run, we find that both the exchange rate and the US 
interest rate are important determinants of Asian stock prices.  
 9 
 
The long-run relationship between exchange rate and share prices are mainly confined to the 
full  sample  period.  The  exchange  rate  variable  has  a  negative  effect  on  stock  prices  of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Korea, consistent with the Markowitz 
theory. For China, we did find a negative long-run relationship. For India, while there is no 
evidence of a cointegrating  equation in the full sample, we do find one in the pre-crisis 
period. Here, a negative relationship between the exchange rate and Indian stock prices is 
found.     
 
Only China and Korea show evidence of a cointegrating relationship between exchange rate 
and  their  stock  prices  in  the  subsample  periods.  China’s  stock  prices  and  the  China-US 
exchange  rate  are  significant  in  the  pre-crisis  and  crisis  period.  An  appreciation  of  the 
Chinese currency against the US dollar leads to an increase in their stock prices in both 
sample periods. In Korea’s case, we see a similar relationship in the crisis period but not in 
the pre-crisis period.   
 
The Asian stock price and the US interest rate nexus are more evident in the long-run than in 
the short-run. We find a significant relationship between the US interest rate and stock prices 
for China and Singapore in the full sample period and the crisis period; for India in the pre-
crisis period; and for Korea in all three periods examined. The signs on this relationship are 
mixed. For China, we find this relationship to be negative, indicating that a decrease in the 
US interest rate has led to an increase in Chinese share prices. In the case of Korea, the 
relationship is found to be positive during the pre-crisis period and negative during crisis 
period.  The  rest  of  the  countries  do  not  show  a  significant  relationship  between  the  US 
interest  rate and stock  prices  in  the crisis  period. However,  India and Singapore show  a 10 
 
positive long-run relationship in the pre-crisis period while for Malaysia there is a negative 
relationship in this period.   
 
 
3.2.3.   Discussion of results 
 
In the short-run, changes in exchange rate and interest rate had no statistically significant 
effects on Chinese stock market returns in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The interest 
rate variable turned out to be statistically insignificant for all countries in the full sample and 
pre-crisis periods. Only for the Philippines in the crisis period the US short-term interest rate 
turned out to be positive and significant (see Table 7). 
 
In tables 4 and 5, we summarise the results on evidence for cointegration and the long-run 
elasticity with respect to exchange rate and interest rate, respectively. The implication of 
cointegration between stock prices, exchange rate and interest rate is as follows. First, it 
implies that stock prices are grounded in economic fundamentals—in our case, they are the 
exchange  rate  and  interest  rate.    Second,  cointegration  implies  that  over  the  long-run, 
economic fundamentals impact stock prices. According to our results, the global financial 
crisis of 2007 weakened the long-run relationship between US macro fundamentals and the 
Asian stock prices. For example, in the case of India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand, in the pre-crisis period there was cointegration between stock prices, exchange 
rates and interest rates; however, in the crisis period there was no such relationship (see Table 
4).  A  second  feature  of  our  results  is  that  in  the  case  of  China  and  South  Korea,  the 
cointegration relationship existed in both periods, meaning that the financial crisis did not 11 
 
disrupt the long-run relationship between the US macro fundamentals and stock prices of 
China and South Korea.  
 
In the case of China, in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods stock prices declined due to 
appreciation  (table  8),  although  the  decline  was  substantially  less  in  the  crisis  period 
compared with the pre-crisis period. This again implies that the global financial crisis did not 
necessarily have a detrimental effect on the Chinese stock market. In the case of South Korea, 
the only other country where cointegration relationship was found in both periods, exchange 
rate  was  statistically  insignificant  in  the  pre-crisis  period,  but  it  became  statistically 
significant in the crisis period—where depreciation reduced stock prices. This implies that 
the crisis period strengthened the impact of the exchange rate on stock prices. 
 
4.   Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we examine the impact of US macroeconomic fundamentals on the stock market 
performance  of  seven  Asian  countries,  namely  China,  India,  the  Philippines,  Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, and South Korea. Due to the short time span of the crisis, one problem 
is the lack of time series observations. To solve this problem, unlike previous studies in this 
literature which has used monthly data, we use daily data. The use of daily data precludes the 
usage of macro variables apart from exchange rate and interest rate simply because daily data 
on economic activity (industrial production mainly), inflation rate, and unemployment rate do 
not exist.  
 
We use daily data for the period 2000 to 2010, and divide the sample into the pre-crisis 
period (pre-August 2007) and the crisis period (post-August 2007). Our main findings are as 12 
 
follows. First, we find that in the short-run changes in the US interest rate has a statistically 
insignificant effect on returns for all countries except the Philippines, for which interest rate 
has a statistically significant positive effect on returns in the crisis period. Second, except for 
China, regardless of the crisis, depreciation had a statistically significant negative effect on 
returns. Third, when the long-run relationship among the variables is considered, for four of 
the seven countries (India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) while evidence of 
cointegration was found in the pre-crisis period, no such evidence was found in the crisis 
period.  This  implies  that  the  financial  crisis  actually  weakened  the  long-run  relationship 
between stock prices and economic fundamentals. Finally, for China and South Korea, the 
cointegration relationship existed in both periods, meaning that the financial crisis did not 
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Table 1: Unit Root Results – ADF test 
Variables  Full Sample   Pre-Crisis  Crisis 








































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The ADF critical values (CVs) at the 5% and 1% levels are -2.863 and -3.434, respectively, for full sample and the sub-sample period 
01/2000-07/2007; and for the sub-sample period 07/2007-01/2010, these are -2.866 and -3.441. The DF-GLS critical values at the 5% and 
1% levels are -1.941 and -2.566 for the full sample, respectively. 17 
 
Table 2: Short-term results from OLS and GARCH models 
  OLS   OLS   OLS      GARCH  GARCH  GARCH 
  Full Sample  Pre-Crisis  Crisis     Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Pre-Crisis 
  log (GSP)  log (GSP)  log (GSP)     log (GSP)  log (GSP)  log (GSP) 
China                    
C  0.030  0.001  -0.052        NA  0.001 
  (0.035)  (0.000)  (0.095)     NA     (0.001) 
log (GERchina/us)  0.020  -0.063  0.447***          -0.857 
  (0.018)  (0.388)  (0.115)     NA  NA   (0.864) 
log (GIR)  -0.353  0.041**  0.023          0.011 
  (0.489)  (0.020)  (0.015)     NA  NA   (0.017) 
R
2  0.002  0.002  0.026     NA  NA   -0.002 
India                    
C  0.001  0.001  0.001     0.001***  0.001***  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
log (GERindia/us)  -1.986***  -1.234***  -2.354***     -1.456***  -0.909***  -2.196*** 
  (0.175)  (0.205)  (0.230)     (0.115)  (0.148)  (0.190) 
log (GIR)  0.007  0.012  0.007     0.000  -0.001  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.021)  (0.011)     (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
R
2  0.130  0.030  0.275     0.119  0.025  0.273 
Malaysia                   
C  0.000  0.000  0.000     0.000  0.000  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
log (GERmalay/us)  -1.011***  -0.960***  -0.007     -0.767***  -0.783***  -0.096 
  (0.107)  (0.134)  (0.105)     (0.069)  (0.128)  (0.092) 
log (Gir)  0.006  0.024  0.013     0.003  0.010  0.012 
  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.009)     (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
R
2  0.061  0.018  0.005     0.057  0.017  -0.001 
Philippines                    
C  0.000  0.001**  0.000     0.001***  0.001***  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
log (GERphili/us)  -0.439**  -0.224  -1.063***     -0.448***  -0.295**  -0.915*** 
  (0.167)  (0.165)  (0.146)     (0.086)  (0.110)  (0.093) 
log (Gir)  0.014  0.028  0.011     0.013**  0.015  0.012*** 18 
 
  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.008)     (0.005)  0.014  (0.003) 
R
2  0.030  0.011  0.117     0.030  (0.010)  0.114 
Singapore                    
C  0.000  0.000  0.000     0.000**  0.000**  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
log (GERsinga/us)  -0.674***  -0.251**  -1.212***     -0.319***  -0.180**  -0.885*** 
  (0.087)  (0.098)  (0.176)     (0.066)  (0.074)  (0.142) 
log (Gir)  0.014  0.017  0.016     0.014  0.016  0.016 
  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.012)     (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.019) 
R
2  0.024  0.004  0.071     0.017  0.003  0.065 
Thailand                    
C  0.000  0.000  0.000     0.001  0.000  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
log (GERthai/us)  -0.655***  -0.550***  -1.058***     -0.802***  -0.749***  -0.682*** 
  (0.122)  (0.136  (0.256)     (0.211)  (0.203)  (0.183) 
log (Gir)  0.006  0.008  0.006     0.002  0.000  0.002 
  (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.019)     (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
R
2  0.022  0.019  0.036     0.020  0.016  0.029 
Korea                    
C  0.000  0.000  0.000     0.001***  0.001***  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
log (GERthai/us)  -0.873***  -0.924***  -0.854***     -0.814***  -0.654***  -0.922*** 
  (0.068)  (0.112)  (0.083)     (0.057)  (0.091)  (0.064) 
log (Gir)  0.015  -0.014  0.022     0.012  0.001  0.021 
  (0.011)  (0.027)  (0.016)     (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
R
2  0.127  0.051  0.315     0.125  0.044  0.312 









Table 3: Cointegration Test Results – Johansen Test 
   
Full Sample  Pre-Crisis  Crisis 
 
No. of Coint. Eqs  Statistic  Critical Value  Statistic  Critical Value  Statistic  Critical Value 
CHINA 
              Trace test  None   90.071*  35.193  68.792*  35.193  62.206*  35.193 
 
At most 1  7.051  20.262  14.764  20.262  21.821  20.262 
 
At most 2  2.071  9.165  1.303  9.165  7.270  9.165 
Max-
eigenvalue 
test   None   83.021*  22.300  54.029*  22.300  40.386*  22.300 
 
At most 1  4.980  15.892  13.461  15.892  14.550  15.892 
 
At most 2  2.071  9.165  1.303  9.165  7.270  9.165 
INDIA 
              Trace test  None  17.836  35.193  35.895*  35.193  29.464  35.193 
 
At most 1  7.926  20.262  6.401  20.262  12.800  20.262 
 
At most 2  1.286  9.165  2.028  9.165  1.615  9.165 
Max-
eigenvalue 
test   None  9.910  22.300  29.493*  22.300  16.664  22.300 
 
At most 1  6.640  15.892  4.373  15.892  11.185  15.892 
 
At most 2  1.286  9.165  2.028  9.165  1.615  9.165 
MALAYSIA 
              Trace test  None   49.714*  35.193  56.230*  35.193  29.032  35.193 
 
At most 1  8.185  20.262  12.704  20.262  10.798  20.262 
 
At most 2  2.762  9.165  5.190  9.165  2.741  9.165 
Max-
eigenvalue 
test   None   41.529*  22.300  43.526*  22.300  18.234  22.300 
 
At most 1  5.423  15.892  7.513  15.892  8.056  15.892 
 
At most 2  2.762  9.165  5.190  9.165  2.741  9.165 
Philippines 
              Trace test  None   38.442*  35.193  36.583*  35.193  25.759  35.193 
 
At most 1  12.764  20.262  9.232  20.262  11.830  20.262 
 
At most 2  3.814  9.165  2.331  9.165  3.951  9.165 





At most 1  8.950  15.892  6.901  15.892  7.879  15.892 
 
At most 2  3.814  9.165  2.331  9.165  3.951  9.165 
Singapore 
              Trace test  None   48.493*  35.193  35.814*  35.193  29.669  35.193 
 
At most 1  7.594  20.262  10.248  20.262  11.979  20.262 
               
 
At most 2  3.250  9.165  1.646  9.165  4.588  9.165 
Max-
eigenvalue 
test   None   40.898*  22.300  25.566*  22.300  17.690  22.300 
 
At most 1  4.344  15.892  8.602  15.892  7.391  15.892 
 
At most 2  3.250  9.165  1.646  9.165  4.588  9.165 
Thailand 
              Trace test  None   42.157*  35.193  39.193*  35.193  27.829  35.193 
 
At most 1  11.115  20.262  7.472  20.262  6.942  20.262 
 
At most 2  2.802  9.165  2.439  9.165  2.684  9.165 
Max-
eigenvalue 
test   None   31.041*  22.300  31.721*  22.300  20.888  22.300 
 
At most 1  8.313  15.892  5.033  15.892  4.257  15.892 
 
At most 2  2.802  9.165  2.439  9.165  2.684  9.165 
Korea 
              Trace test  None   36.281*  35.193  39.887*  35.193  36.281*  35.193 
 
At most 1  16.706  20.262  14.447  20.262  16.706  20.262 
 
At most 2  2.635  9.165  1.303  9.165  2.635  9.165 
Max-
eigenvalue 
test   None  19.575  22.300  25.440  22.300  19.575  22.300 
 
At most 1  14.071  15.892  13.144  15.892  14.071  15.892 
 
At most 2  2.635  9.165  1.303  9.165  2.635  9.165 















Table 4: No. of Cointegrating Equations – A summary from Johansen test 
  Full sample  Pre-crisis  Crisis 
China  1  1  1 
India  0  1  0 
Malaysia  1  1  0 
Philippines  1  1  0 
Singapore  1  1  0 
Thailand  1  1  0 




Table 5: Short-term results from the ECM-GARCH results 
   ECM-Garch          
ECM-
Garch  ECM-Garch  ECM-Garch 
   Full Sample  sub-sample 1  sub-sample 2   
Full 
Sample  sub-sample 1  sub-sample 2 
China                  
C        0.001  C       0.000 
         (0.001)          (0.000) 
log (GERchina/us)     -0.983  RESID(-1)
2       0.069 
        (0.863)          (0.030) 
log (GIR)       0.015  GARCH(-1)       0.916*** 
        (0.017)         (0.040) 
ECM(-1)        -0.010          
         (0.005)          
R
2        -0.001          
India                    
C     0.001***     C     0.000   
      (0.000)          (0.000)   
log (GERindia/us)     -0.894***     RESID(-1)
2     0.167   
      (0.149)          (0.037)   
log (GIR)     -0.002     GARCH(-1)     0.788   
      (0.013)         (0.042)   
ECM(-1)    0.001           
     (0.001)           
R
2    0.026           
Malaysia                
C  0.001***  6.632     C  0.000***  0.000**   
   (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.000)  (0.000)   
log (GERmalay/us)  -0.774***  -0.026     RESID(-1)
2  0.105***  0.203***   
   (0.070)  (0.021)        (0.019)  (0.040)   
log (Gir)  0.004  -0.053     GARCH(-1)  0.893***  0.796***   
   (0.006)  (0.706)       (0.015)  (0.038)   
ECM(-1)  -0.002  1.033***            
   (0.001)  (0.003)            
R
2  0.055  0.248            
Philippines               
C  0.001  0.001***     C  0.000***  0.000***   
   (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.000)  (0.000)   
log (GERphili/us)  -0.445**  -0.292***     RESID(-1)
2  0.110***  0.090***   
   (0.087)  (0.110)        (0.018)  (0.019)   
log (Gir)  0.013  0.014**     GARCH(-1)  0.853***  0.871***   
   (0.005)  (0.014)       (0.019)  (0.024)   23 
 
ECM(-1)  0.000  0.001            
   (0.001)  (0.001)            
R
2  0.030  0.010             
Singapore                  
C  0.001  0.001     C  0.000***  0.000***   
   (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.000)  (0.000)   
log (GERsinga/us)  -0.323***  -0.187**     RESID(-1)
2  0.098***  0.089***   
   (0.066)  (0.074)        (0.008)  (0.009)   
log (Gir)  0.015  0.017     GARCH(-1)  0.899***  0.905***    
   (0.012)  (0.016)       (0.008)  (0.008)   
ECM(-1)  -0.002  -0.005**            
   (0.002)  (0.002)             
R
2  0.016  0.003             
Thailand                  
C  0.000  0.000     C  0.000  0.000   
   (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.000)  (0.000)   
log (GERthai/us)  -0.810***  -0.753***     RESID(-1)
2  0.116***  0.111***   
   (0.216)  (0.203)       (0.025)  (0.033)   
log (Gir)  -0.001  0.001     GARCH(-1)  0.782***  0.738***    
   (0.009)  (0.014)       (0.069)  (0.091)   
ECM(-1)  -0.001  -0.001             
   (0.001)  (0.001)              
R
2  0.020  0.016              
Korea                   
C  0.001***  0.001***  0.001**  C  0.000**  0.000**  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  0.001     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
log (GERthai/us)  -0.815***  -0.656***  -0.944***  RESID(-1)
2  0.075***  0.066***  0.100** 
   (0.056)  (0.092)  0.061     (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.038) 
log (Gir)  0.011  0.001  0.023  GARCH(-1)  0.921***  0.931***  0.889*** 
   (0.011)  (0.019)  0.014    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.031) 
ECM(-1)  -0.001  -0.001  -0.029**         
   (0.001)  (0.002)  0.011          
R
2  0.126  0.045  0.326             
Notes: The standard errors are in the parenthesis. **(***) denote statistical significance of the variable at the 5%(1%) level 24 
 
Table 6: Long Run Results 
 
Full Sample  Pre-Crisis  Crisis 
China 
      c  -6.090  0.206***  -5.625 
 
(-3.660)  (0.155)  (-6.045) 
Log (ER)  6.520***  -29.846***  -6.866** 
 
(1.796)  (-4.766)  (-3.107) 
Log (IR)  -0.628***  70.284  -0.247** 
 
(-0.136)  (10.092)  (-0.089) 
India 




   
(19.086) 
  Log (ER)  -  -10.546**  - 
   
(-5.029) 




   
(0.367) 
  Malaysia 
      c  13.037***  -13.341 
 
 
(0.555)  (-1.023) 
  Log (ER)  -4.787***  -5.038***  - 
 
(-0.428)  (-0.763) 
  Log (IR)  0.001  0.031 
 
 
(0.023)  (0.031) 
  Philippines 
    c  25.136***  12.363** 
 
 
(4.423)  (4.957) 
  Log (ER)  -4.564***  -1.420  - 
 
(-1.126)  (-1.232) 
  Log (IR)  -0.132  0.121 
 
 
(-0.108)  (0.152) 
  Singapore 




(0.108)  (0.338) 
  Log (ER)  -3.160***  -1.126 
 
 
(-0.224)  (-0.596)  - 
Log (IR)  0.146***  0.248*** 
 
 
(0.020)  (0.046) 
  Thailand 
      c  17.351***  10.938*** 
 
 
(1.771)  (2.975)  - 
Log (ER)  -3.021***  -1.272 
 
 
(-0.486)  (-0.795) 
  Log (IR)  0.041  -0.031 
 
 
(0.051)  (-0.084) 
  Korea 
      c  40.664***  -4.002  41.374*** 
 
(3.600)  (-6.539)  (6.835) 
Log (ER)  -4.782***  1.461  -4.877*** 
 
(-0.509)  (0.921)  (-0.974) 
Log (IR)  -0.375***  0.456***  -0.521*** 
 
(-0.065)  (0.154)  (-0.122) 
Notes: The standard errors are in the parenthesis. **(***) denote statistical significance of the variable at the 5%(1%) level 26 
 
 Table 7: The Impact of an increase in GER or GIR on Equity Returns (GSP): A summary of short-run results 
  Full Sample  Pre-Crisis  Crisis 
CHINA       
GER       
GIR       
INDIA       
GER  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
GIR       
MALAYSIA       
GER  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
GIR       
PHILIPPINES       
GER  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
GIR  ↑    ↑ 
SINGAPORE       
GER  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
GIR       
THAILAND       
GER  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
GIR       
SOUTH KOREA       
GER  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
GIR       
Notes: Only significant results, at the 5 per cent or better, are reported here. 27 
 
Table 8: The Impact of an increase in Log (ER) or Log (IR) on log (SP): A summary of long-run results 
  Full Sample  Pre-Crisis  Crisis 
CHINA       
Log (ER)  ↑  ↓  ↓ 
Log (IR)  ↓    ↓ 
INDIA       
Log (ER)    ↓   
Log (IR)    ↑   
MALAYSIA       
Log (ER)  ↓  ↓   
Log (IR)       
PHILIPPINES       
Log (ER)  ↓     
Log (IR)       
SINGAPORE       
Log (ER)  ↓     
Log (IR)  ↑  ↑   
THAILAND       
Log (ER)  ↓     
Log (IR)       
SOUTH KOREA       
Log (ER)  ↓    ↓ 
Log (IR)  ↓  ↑  ↓ 
Notes: Only significant results, at the 5 per cent or better, are reported here. 